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BAR BRIEFS
3. A offers a reward to anyone who will deliver to him a certain
book or who will promise to do so. B, who owns the book requested,
learns of the offer, but is not induced thereby to part with the book.
C, learning of the facts, threatens B with such personal violence unless
he delivers or promises to deliver the book to A that, rather than fail
to comply with C's demand, B would have given A the book for nothing,
but knowing of the offer he determines to accept it, and he either gives
A the book or promises A to do so. On the first supposition there is
a unilateral contract; on the second a bilateral contract.
4. A writes an offer to B, which he encloses in an envelope and
stamps. Shortly afterwards, he decides not to send the offer and
determines to throw the letter into his wastebasket. Absent-mindedly,
he takes it up with other letters and deposits it in a mail chute. It is
delivered to B, who accepts the offer. There is a contract.
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IT COULDN'T BE DONE-BUT IT WAS
The Supreme Court of the United States represents the last word
in judicial dignity and interpretation of law, but it has doubtless fallen
into error on several occasions, and in at least one case it admitted the
error before the final decision was written. Hon. Chas. E. Hughes,
in his book on "The Supreme Court of the United States", relates the
incident in the following manner: "I may mention an interesting in-
cident which the published reports of the Court fail to show. I refer
to American Emigrant Company vs. County of Adams, ioo U. S. 6I.
"The case was argued at the end of November, 1878, and the deci-
sion was announced in the middle of the following December. Counsel
for appellant filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied. Being
unconvinced, the appellant retained General Benjamin Butler, who went
into open Court and asked for permission to file a second petition, stat-
ing that he was sure that the Court had inadvertently fallen into error,
and that he was confident that if the Court would take the time to read
his petition they would thank him for calling the matter to their
attention.
"Before this, to ask twice for a rehearing was unheard of; and it
is said that the Court was quick to show its disapproval of the innova-
tion, and severe in its criticism of General Butler. But, feeling sure
of the justice of his cause, and with his accustomed audacity, he stood
his ground, with the result that the minutes of April 14, 1879, show this
entry: 'On motion of Mr. B. F. Butler it is ordered that the mandate
be withheld in this case for the present.'
"The Court then considered the second petition for rehearing, and
on April 21, 1879, a rehearing was ordered. The case was re-argued




A well-written article appearing in the June issue of the Kiwanis
Magazine, penned by Prof. H. E. Willis, formerly of the North Dakota
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Law School and now of Indiana University, deals with the formulation
of what Professor Willis terms an adequate scheme of social control.
He lists twelve reforms, with each of which he deals analytically
and more or less effectively, but without presenting any new or novel
thought except the following:
"Universal -disarmament of individuals, except as they are con-
nected with the military establishment of the government, should be re-
quired. It is necessary to disarm the criminal, and the only way to do
so is to disarm everybody, including the police."
We find it a little difficult to agree that the inclusion of the three
word addenda would add anything to the theoretical ability of the gov-
ernment to control the crime situation; in fact, we would not be sur-
prised to find many people of sound mind and memory who would
seriously question the practical effectiveness of the whole suggestion.
So long as guns are manufactured, bad men will get them. It would
be our guess, moreover, that the bad men would be the last to be dis-
armed; and if disarmed, they would still find clubs, knives and stones.
It appears, also, that we are running rather short on Irish policemen,
and we rather doubt if any other nationality could successfully handle
the average run of bad men by making faces or using fists. Professor
Willis, of course, reasons thus: "If good men are permitted to arm,
all bad men will be armed; armed better than the good men, and the
bad men will be better shots than the good men." But why limit the




Notwithstanding the fact that poor people would frequently be
deprived of the services of a competent lawyer unless such services
could be obtained on a contingent fee basis, and that such arrangements
should, therefore, be permitted; nevertheless, there is a growing indica-
tion among lawyers and judges that the evils that have established them-
selves through the medium of these contingent fee arrangements are
being recognized, and with that recognition has come constructive effort
to eliminate the evils.
"Ambulance chasing", "running", "touting", "crooked doctors",
"subornation of perjury", are phrases frequently employed in speeches
and writings these days, and occasionally we find someone who insists
that a clean-cut trial on the merits in a negligence case is as rare as a
successful flight across the Atlantic.
Whatever of evil grows or flourishes in connection with lawsuits,
whether sprung from the soil of legal procedure or planted by outside
agencies, eventually becomes a discredit to the profession itself, and,
as a matter of self-protection, the profession must deal with conditions
and seek to eliminate the evil.
Regulation and supervision of contingent fee contracts by the
courts may not prove to be the most available or effective remedy for
the evils that are admitted to exist, but they do suggest constructive
effort to correct a growingly dangerous condition. It is to be hoped,
